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A Building Information Model (BIM) is an electronic repository of structured,
three-dimensional data that captures both the physical and dynamic functional
characteristics of a facility. In addition to its more traditional function as a tool to
aid design and construction, a building information model can be used throughout
the lifecycle of a facility, functioning as a living database that places resources
contained within the building in their spatial and temporal context. Through
its comprehension of spatial relationships, a BIM can meaningfully represent and
integrate previously isolated control and management systems and processes, and
thereby provide a more intuitive interface to users. By placing processes in a
spatial context, decision-making can be improved, with positive ow-on eects for
security and eciency. In this article, we systematically analyse the authorisation
requirements involved in the use of building information models. We introduce the
concept of using a building information model as a graphical tool to support spatial
access control conguration and management (including physical access control).
We also consider authorisation requirements for regulating access to the structured
data that exists within a BIM as well as to external systems and data repositories
that can be accessed via the BIM interface. With a view to addressing these
requirements we present a survey of relevant spatiotemporal access control models,
focusing on features applicable to building information models and highlighting
capability gaps. Finally, we present a conceptual authorisation framework that
utilises building information models.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Building Information Models (BIM) are used in the
elds of building design, construction and facility
management. Traditionally, their main application
has been in facilitating information exchange, using
a virtual representation of the building that is a
direct analogue of the physical structure, among
dierent stakeholders engaged in building design and
construction. More recently, there has been recognition
of the potential value of using a BIM after a building
is commissioned as a tool to manage the facility and
the increasingly complex processes that occur within
it [1]. In this setting a BIM can act as a graphical `front
end' or portal to provide integrated access to a range of
complex but currently independent subsystems that are
essential to the operation of a modern facility. These
include Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
(HVAC) control systems, asset management, fault
handling and maintenance systems, re control systems,
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitoring systems
and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS). To
understand the benets of integration consider the
following scenario: an operator is notied of a
malfunctioning pump via a graphical display on a three
dimensional building map. The interface immediately
gives them the option of remotely shutting down
the pump - a step which requires interaction of the
BIM with the HVAC control subsystem. A CCTV
camera feed from the plant room automatically appears
allowing the operator to view the aected area for
intruders or damaging leaks. Further, they are able
to check the warranty status of the pump and raise a
service request with the supplier. This step requires
interaction with the asset management subsystem.
BIM-based integration oers eciency gains because
the operator no longer needs to independently locate
and interact with the object of interest through multiple
`stove-piped' systems. Moreover, the actions required
to respond to the event can be formalised as a step-
by-step process or workow that is managed in an
integrated way through the BIM. We argue that recent
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proposals [1] to use a BIM in this way introduce complex
security challenges. In particular, an overarching
authorisation system is required to ensure that this
powerful monitoring and control capability is only
available to users possessing appropriate authority.
The need to maintain security in an integrated way
is becoming a high priority with the ever-increasing
reliance on information and communications technology
across all aspects of facilities operation. This need is
particularly pressing in facilities that are exposed to
complex threats such as ports and airports, chemical
manufacturing plants, defence facilities, power stations
and the like.
1.1. Authorisation for BIM
The term authorisation refers to a security service and
related processes that grant or deny requests made
by authenticated users to access resources according
to rules (also referred to as a security policy).
Authorisation encompasses both authentication (are
users who they say they are?) and access control
(should ta user's requests to access a resource be
granted?). Some authors distinguish authorisation from
access control (i.e., access decision making) [2]. When
this distinction is drawn, authorisation refers to the
formulation of access policy, which allocates access
rights to users, and access control is the enforcement of
the policy via allow/deny responses to access requests.
In this article, we take the more common approach of
using both terms interchangeably.
We use the term logical access control to refer to
the service that regulates access to resources that
take the form of information and information services.
Examples of information include: the BIM elements
themselves (i.e. BIM content - the structured objects
that represent walls, wiring, pipes etc.) and information
that is generated or stored outside the BIM but made
accessible through it e.g., digital CCTV footage or the
operational status of a pump (made available via a
HVAC control system). An example of an information
service is a function within an asset management
system that initiates and subsequently manages the
lifecycle of a maintenance request for a faulty piece of
equipment. In contrast, and consistent with its widely
understood meaning, we use the term physical access
control to refer to the service that regulates human
access to spaces within a facility. One of the goals for
our BIM authorisation architecture is to unify logical
and physical access control within a single cohesive
framework.
The distinction that we have drawn between
resources that are BIM-internal and BIM-external
reects two distinct access control contexts that a BIM
authorisation framework must address: it must be
capable of enforcing security policies with respect to the
BIM content as well as regulating access to resources
accessed via the BIM but external to it. We will briey
introduce each of these aspects in turn and consider
them in more detail in Section 4.
Controlling access to BIM content is important,
because dierent elements and spaces within the model
are subject to dierent access rules. Much of the
information in a BIM may be operationally sensitive
so users should only have access when they have a
legitimate `need to know'. For example, the details
of the critical network wirings need not be visible to
an air-conditioning maintenance operator. Thus, the
visualisation of a building information model needs to
be controlled based on the role, assigned tasks (and
possibly other contextual factors such as time and
location) of the user. This authorisation capability
also needs to be included in BIM tools such as design
analysis tools, model servers, and BIM viewers.
Authorisation for the BIM-external case is more
challenging. The usage scenario we are interested in
involves the use of BIM as a unifying `front end' to
a range of disparate systems each of which may also
have its own authorisation system. For example, the
HVAC system may have its own database of users and
their associated roles (maintenance engineer, control
room operator etc.) which determine the operations
they can perform. If a control room operator is
accessing the HVAC system through the BIM, the two
authorisation services must be able to cooperate to
enforce the security policy. Ideally, the two systems
would leverage an enterprise-wide identity and access
management framework which would avoid the need to
manage duplicate user databases for each application.
Integration of the authorisation systems of the BIM and
associated subsystems presents a range of challenges
which we examine in greater detail in later sections.
1.2. Spatial authorisation
The demand for spatially aware access control systems
has increased in the past decade with the widespread
adoption of location-based services [3]. Many new
application scenarios have emerged that use geospatial
data organised in dierent thematic layers representing
dierent aspects of the application domain [4].
A key advantage of using a BIM to support
authorisation is that it allows an organisation to dene
and reliably enforce access control policies that have
a spatial dimension - a powerful capability that is
currently not delivered. For example, an organisation
may have a policy that only Human Resource sta
can access the part of the building where sensitive
HR records are stored (the `Restricted HR zone').
The PACS administrator implements this policy by
manually identifying the access controlled doors that
give access to this space and conguring the physical
access control system (PACS) to give HR sta access to
each aected door. Because currently available physical
access control systems have no spatial awareness, there
is no way to express the concept of `Restricted HR Zone'
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other than as a set of door identiers. If the space is
remodelled, this conguration must be changed and a
dierent set of doors may be aected but again, they
need to be manually identied and there is ample room
for error, particularly in large and complex facilities.
If the PACS is integrated with a BIM, the zones
can be graphically marked out on an electronic
oor plan by an administrator and a BIM tool can
perform computational ow analysis based on geometric
reasoning [5] to automatically identify the set of aected
doors. The key point is that the BIM is capable of
calculating and expressing the correspondence between
a logical spatial concept - the Restricted HR Zone - and
its physical manifestation in terms of extent and door
connectivity. More importantly, it can keep this up-
to-date so that the security policy can be expressed at
a high level of abstraction using a logical concept that
does not need to change (i.e. only HR sta can access
the Restricted HR Zone). If the physical space changes
this can be reected in the model and the necessary
PACS conguration can be automatically `recompiled'.
This leads to a higher level of assurance that the
security policy is actually being enforced, thereby
assisting organisations in meeting audit and compliance
obligations, which are increasingly onerous for security-
sensitive facilities. We provide more examples of spatial
access policies in Section 2.
The ability to compute and visualise access control
policies that have a spatial dimension is a powerful
capability that becomes possible with our proposed
BIM-enabled authorisation framework. As we have
noted, it allows the BIM to function as a visual
design tool to accurately formulate and review access
control rules and policies. Since a BIM supports
geometrical reasoning [5], with our framework it is
possible to calculate and display the areas that will
be accessible for a given low-level PACS rule set.
New rule sets can also be automatically compiled to
the low-level format used by the PACS. Conguration
and analysis based on geometric reasoning has the
advantage that it can identify indirect access paths
that may be overlooked when the conguration is
developed or audited manually based on a oor plan
e.g., a restricted area may be unintentionally accessible
through a complex route via a lower oor. It can also
assist a security administrator who wishes to know if a
highly sensitive area is indirectly accessible from a lower
security area via false ceilings, ventilation ducts or walls
made from materials that can be easily breached (as
shown in Figure 1).
This is a useful capability when a building is
rst being designed and subsequently for the facility
managers to plan remodelling and partitioning of spaces
subject to dierent access rules. Further, the BIM can
also function as an access control simulator that can
be used to analyse dierent access control scenarios
such as path nding for evacuation in response to re
in dierent parts of the building - a capability that
FIGURE 1. The need for 3D models in Security Analysis
(a) a wall going up to the underside of the slab of the
oor above (b) a wall going up to ceiling height, with the
possibility of access through the ceiling space.
could be valuable in developing emergency response
plans [6, 7].
The use of spatial attributes in authorisation policies
has gained popularity among researchers in the past
decade with the widespread adoption of geographic
information systems (GIS) and the ability to track
resources spatially. However, limited research has been
carried out in the area of spatial authorisation for
BIMs, which dier from the traditional GIS context,
particularly in terms of scale, how three dimensional
data is structured and the granularity of spatial
information for indoor models. Indeed, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no published research on using
Building Information Models for access control.
1.3. Converged physical and logical access
control
The concept of security convergence [8] merges the
physical security and logical security operations to
ll in the gaps and interfaces between these two
functions and provides more ecient and eective
security. An integrated authorisation system for
physical security and logical security will enable using
two-way interaction between these two systems in
decision-making. For example, the logical access control
function can infer location status of a user from the
physical access control system to determine if the user
has entered the specied spatial zone before accessing
a spatially bounded information system. Information
from a workow and scheduling system might be used
to congure physical access control rules based on task
location and required access zones. This approach
can enhance security management and access policy
denition.
The concept of convergence in access control
for physical and logical security systems is based
on a unied repository of user identity data and
associated attributes [9]. Information technology
has permeated physical security systems in recent
years. This has brought many security issues to
physical security systems that were once specic to
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information systems. Even though physical security
and information security are managed independently in
most organisations, they share the same goal of securing
organisational resources. This two-level approach leads
to administration overhead and reduces overall control
in security [10]. A converged access control approach
gives organisations more control and consistency over
security management. There are many common aspects
between controlling access to information systems and
physical spaces. The basic subject, object, and access
type relations in information systems can be interpreted
as a person, physical structure and physical access
type relations in physical access control [11]. One
of the goals of our proposed authorisation framework
is to apply unied approaches for access control in
heterogeneous systems with physical and logical access
control subsystems.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
In Section 2 we present an example scenario that we
will use throughout to illustrate dierent spatial access
control issues. Section 3 discusses dierent aspects of
spatial data models and the central concepts of building
information models. In Section 4 we categorise the
forms of access control needed for building information
models and in Section 5 we summarise the key
requirements for a BIM authorisation framework.
Section 6 identies key features of access control models
that are able to perform spatio-temporal authorisation.
Using these features or distinguishing characteristics as
a basis for comparison, Section 7 reviews a number
of signicant spatiotemporal access control models and
their ability to address the requirements previously
identied. In Section 8 we propose our conceptual
model for an authorisation framework using building
information models. Finally we conclude in Section 9.
2. EXAMPLE SCENARIO
In this section, we present an example scenario,
which serves to illustrate the concepts introduced
in later sections. We consider a facility of an
organisation that houses multiple divisions. We assume
independent subsystems are used for closed-circuit
television monitoring, lighting control, temperature
sensors, smoke sensors, and physical access control to
building spaces.
Suppose Alice is a divisional human resource
administrator who authorises access by employees to
dierent spaces in the facility. She is able to approve
and revoke access to users within her division to
spaces that are used by her division and common
areas. Bob is the facility's operations manager
responsible for facilities management. He is able to
assign both sta and contracted technicians to perform
maintenance on dierent subsystems such as lighting
water and sewerage. He needs to grant access to
a contracted technician only when there is a current
repair or maintenance job. He must ensure that the
technicians cannot access sensitive parts of the facility
that are not related to their assignment. Charlie is a
computer technician handling the server room, Dave
is a technician for the temperature sensors, and Eddie
is an electrician responsible for the lighting subsystem.
They can access the subsystem controllers from the
control room, and Bob controls their access privileges
to dierent spaces.
The building areas are divided into zones to which
dierent access policies apply. Multiple divisions use
the building control room and a shared server room, but
access is tightly restricted. Further, the general oce
area is divided based on the occupying organisational
division such as marketing, human resources, and
nance. The control room houses a command and
control application with controlling interfaces to all
the subsystems. These can be accessed by either the
facilities management team or technicians associated
with the subsystems. For example, in a normal
operating environment Eddie can access the lighting
subsystem that controls the lighting of the building, but
not the temperature sensors. The command and control
system has two-way communication to the subsystems.
The incoming data from the subsystems include the
status and operational data from dierent sensors. The
outgoing data include commands and instructions to
control the subsystems, which can be used to change
the operation of dierent devices. These commands can
be issued directly to the devices or to another system
that controls the low-level sensors.
Suppose the command and control application is fed
with status data from all subsystems, including each
temperature sensor. It can then generate a temperature
gradient oor map for the whole building using its
knowledge of the spatial position and context of each
sensor. The building information model will also store
the physical position of other elements such as CCTV
cameras, lights, smoke sensors, and door controllers. By
representing these active elements on a 2D plan or a
3D virtual space an operator can interact with them
visually to issue commands or access status data or
information feeds. For example, they could click on
CCTV camera icon to view the real-time video stream.
Access control in this organisational scenario can be
complex. Alice should be able to control who can access
the control room. Charlie can view the temperature
gradient map of the server room only, but Dave can
have access for the whole building. Eddie can access the
status of lighting for the whole building. He can select a
particular room from the spatial visualisation and issue
a shutdown command. However, this can be executed
only when Bob assigns him for a maintenance task in
that room. The organisational policy also states any
technician entering the server room must be authorised
by Charlie in addition to Bob. These complex access
control scenarios are dicult to accommodate using
traditional access control systems. A primary purpose
of our work is to provide a framework that supports
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these scenarios. We discuss these dierent approaches
in the following sections.
3. SPATIAL DATA MODELS
This section will introduce existing spatial data models
that can be used for spatial representation of buildings
and facilities. A spatial data model denes how
spatial data are stored and represented within spatial
databases. It would also dene how these data could
be analysed and manipulated. Spatial data models
can be divided into two broad categories: outdoor
models and indoor models. This basic categorisation
stems from granularity, type, and structure of spatial
data required for the applications of indoor models
versus those of outdoor models [12, 13]. The
rest of this section will introduce City Geographic
Markup Language, Building Information Modelling,
and Industry Foundation Classes, and discuss their
features and shortcomings in the context of access
control.
3.1. City Geographic Markup Language
Virtual three-dimensional models of cities can be
utilised across multiple application domains such
as urban planning, disaster management, facility
management, and environmental simulations. Until
recently, most of these models were used for graphical or
geometric representation of environments without the
semantic or topological aspects, which are necessary
for spatial analysis and data mining [14]. The Open
Geospatial Consortium (OGC) developed Geography
Markup Language (GML) [15] as a standard for
storage and transport of geographic information and
as a comprehensive modelling language for geographic
systems.1
City Geography Markup Language (CityGML) [16]
is an XML based storage and exchange format for
virtual city models. Technically, CityGML is an
application schema of the Geography Markup Language
3 (GML3) [16]. It provides appearance, topological,
semantic and geometrical models by dening the classes
and relations for the representation of most three-
dimensional urban objects such as built structures,
elevation, vegetations, water bodies, etc. In CityGML,
the appearance model provides \observable properties"
for object surfaces, which can be used to represent
visual data and other arbitrary categories such as
infrared radiation, noise pollution, or structural stress.
The CityGML thematic model contains class denitions
for important object types that are required by dierent
application areas. Real-world entities correspond to
features such as buildings, walls, or doors in the
semantic level. At thematic level, extension modules
1GML is an XML based encoding grammar developed by the
OGC as a feature based modelling language that maps the real
world geographic information into feature sets. Refer to [15] for
more information.
are dened for dierent application areas such as
transportation, vegetation, or waterbody. The thematic
classes can contain both spatial and non-spatial
attributes. Non-spatial attributes are properties such
as creation dates, image URIs, or year of construction.
It can also dene interrelationships like aggregations,
generalisations, and associations for feature classes.
CityGML supports multiple level of granularity
through dierent Levels of Detail (LOD). This provides
ve independent LODs, LOD0 to LOD4, and each
object in CityGML can be represented in dierent levels
of resolution. LOD0 has the lowest class of accuracy
that is used to model regions and landscapes. In
its basic level, it can represent an aerial image or a
map in a two and a half dimensional digital terrain
model. Buildings in this level are represented by either
footprint or roof edge polygons. LOD1 is a blocks model
in which building structures are aggregated into simple
blocks with no further details. LOD2 has detailed
roof structures and boundary surfaces. LOD3 provides
granular details of roofs and walls including doors
and windows. It can represent external architectural
models and land marks. The levels up to LOD3 in
CityGML can be used to model outdoor spaces. LOD4
of CityGML attempts to bring indoor and outdoor
representations more closely by considering indoor
specic object details. LOD4 provides the highest level
of details of all LODs and it adds interior structures
of building to a LOD3 model. The Building module
of CityGML enables representing thematic and spatial
aspects of building, including indoor building structure.
LOD4 can be used to represent constructive elements
in architectural models. The interior structure of a
building such as rooms, doors, stairs, and furniture can
be modelled in LOD4. Interior installations in LOD4
classify objects that are permanently attached to the
building structure and cannot be moved. For example,
objects such as pipes, wiring, or interior stairs can be
represented as interior installations. These objects can
be associated with a room or the complete building.
Even though LOD4 provides the foundation for
spatial modelling of indoor environments, it still lacks
the functionality and the granularity that may be
needed for applications such as indoor navigation [17,
18]. IndoorGML is a work in progress towards an indoor
spatial modelling based on CityGML. It is particularly
focused on providing a framework for the integration of
dierent positioning and localisation technologies that
are used to assist in indoor navigation, but cannot be
directly modelled using CityGML [19, 20]. IndoorGML
seems to be relevant to our work, however the details of
the model are yet to be published.2
2There are recent eorts to standardise IndoorGML un-
der OGC [21]. To this end, the IndoorGML Standard
Working Group [21] was formed in January 2012, how-
ever no further information about the status of the stan-
dard is available. Refer to their website for more details:
http://www.opengeospatial.org/projects/groups/indoorgmlswg
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3.2. Building information modelling
The overall goal of building information modelling
is to provide a common repository of semantically
rich three-dimensional information that can be used
seamlessly and sequentially by all members of the
design and construction team, and ultimately by
the owner/operator of a facility throughout the
facility's life cycle [22]. BIM technology extends
into fully integrated 3D and 4D modelling (adding
the time dimension for scheduling or sequencing)
of the building design. This process produces the
Building Information Model (BIM), which incorporates
spatial relationships, geographic information, building
geometry, and quantities and properties of building
components, including the life-cycle processes of
construction and facility operation. The use of
building information modelling in this context has
gained increasing acceptance around dierent industries
during the past years [23, 24]. Even though
other types of data models such as CityGML
exist that can be used for buildings, the wider
architecture/engineering/construction (AEC) research
community, private sector, and governments have
adopted building information modelling as the way
forward for buildings [25, 26, 27].
A major element of the success of BIM is establishing
common software protocols [22, 28]. The Industry
Foundation Classes (IFC) is a leading standard for
achieving BIM interoperability. IFC is an object-based
data model developed by the International Alliance for
Interoperability (IAI) to facilitate interoperability of
building information models [22]. IFCs are a commonly
used format for BIMs in architectural, engineering,
and construction (AEC) industries. The IFC data
model is used as the interchange le format between
dierent stakeholders of buildings to exchange software
independent building information models. For example,
a building information model produced by an architect
using computer aided design software can be used by the
building operator in the facilities management software.
The use of IFC standard enables continuous industry-
wide sharing of information for the life cycle of the
building.
The IFC is an object-based information model for
storing and exchanging data about buildings. It
denes a spatial hierarchy - a project contains one or
more sites, a site contains one or more buildings, a
building contains one or more storeys, storeys contain
spaces, walls etc. and spaces contain furniture and
ttings. Each object in the model has a standard set of
properties, but users can add non-standard information
using the in-built extension mechanisms. While the
above hierarchy is a strict tree structure, systems of
objects can be dened that span multiple storeys or
buildings, such as a security control system. A single
object can be part of many systems if necessary.
The IfcProduct class denes the base for all physical
objects within an IFC model. The IfcRelationship
class creates relationships between objects. The
ve basic relationship representations are composition,
assignment, connectivity, association, and denition.
For example, when a wall is connected to a beam, the
wall object of IfcWall class and the beam object of
IfcBeam class can be associated by the relationship class
IfcRelConnects. The IfcRelDecomposes class represents
containment relationships such as IfcBuildingStorey
containing IfcSpaces.
The IFC model is supported by the major
architectural CAD systems and an increasing number
of engineering CAD and analysis systems. Since most
buildings last much longer than the computer software
that is used to design them, a major benet of the IFC
model is that it supports an ASCII character-based le
format that can be archived to remove dependencies on
particular software vendors.
While the IFC model supports le-based exchange,
this is not convenient for intensive use of IFC-
based representations. Model servers are specialised
databases that store information so that it can be
continuously accessed and modied by multiple users.
If a building is modelled in an IFC compatible CAD
system, it can then be exported to a model server,
where it can be used to support day-to-day operations.
If the facilities management and control systems are
integrated with the server, the IFC model will be
updated every time there is a change in the building.
This will ensure that the current data is always
available.
3.3. CityGML vs. BIMs
Both CityGML and BIMs are semantic models
that are targeted at dierent scales and scopes of
representations [20]. There are three signicant
dierences between CityGML and BIMs with regards
to their suitability as a spatial data model for access
control.
First, in CityGML, surface observations of topo-
graphic features are used to derive three-dimensional
objects. In BIMs, a generative modelling approach is
used to represent how a three-dimensional object is con-
structed [29]. BIMs provide details semantic represen-
tations of all building elements. A unied BIM for a
facility would include objects and elements from all do-
mains, such as architectural, engineering, construction,
or facility management. More importantly, BIMs in-
clude representations of hidden objects such as pipes,
wiring in-between walls, ceilings, and oors with a ner
granularity. This is an important feature when we are
concerned about all aspects of access control. For exam-
ple, the possibility of capturing data from communica-
tion cables, also known as packet sning [30], can only
be inferred if the critical network cabling information is
available in the data model.
Second, CityGML does not provide a specic concept
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for the representation of storeys [16]. Storeys however
play an important role in access control. The ability to
represent multi-storey buildings and objects that share
across multiple stories such as lifts and escalators are
important in determining access control. Thus, it is
vital to have a concrete representation within the model
to support this rather than ad-hoc workarounds that are
used in CityGML.
Third, BIMs are used from the preliminary stages
of building design and evolve throughout its life cycle.
This provides the possibility for security and access
control design process to be incorporated from the early
stages, rather than as an afterthought.
Due to the above dierences and advantages, in the
rest of this article, we consider BIMs as a spatial data
model for the authorisation framework that will be
proposed in Section 8.
4. FORMS OF BIM-BASED ACCESS CON-
TROL
It is essential to clarify the context of spatiotemporal
authorisation in real world applications to understand
the need for an advanced authorisation framework
using building information models. Figure 2 shows
information ows between entities in an authorisation
framework that uses a BIM. Each information ow, or
each arrow point in the diagram, introduces an access
control requirement. We group these access control
requirements into two major categories: BIM content
and external resources. The external resources can
be further categorised based on their interaction with
BIMs as BIM-aware and BIM-unaware. In this section,
































FIGURE 2. Information ow between building
information model and subsystems
4.1. Access control for BIM content
In this category, we are focused on controlling access
to data contained within a BIM representation - the
BIM content. There are two distinct sub-categories
of resources requiring controlled access: rstly, the
building elements and their associated attributes (i.e.
elements that can be represented as IFC objects);
secondly, any data or information fed from external
sources that is stored in a separate data store, but
closely coupled to existing BIM elements via their
unique identiers. This data store can be used to
archive data generated by external systems that have
no native spatial awareness, to give the data spatial
context e.g., temperature readings from sensors linked
to the HVAC system can each be stored together with
the unique identier of the BIM object representing that
sensor. The data can then be analysed and represented
spatially.
There are multiple modes of access required for BIM
internal data as shown in Figure 2. For example, a
visualisation tool may only require read access to BIM
objects to render a oor plan and overlay temperature
gradients based on sensor readings from a linked data
repository. Systems that can manipulate the BIM and
make changes to building elements or internal data
will need read and write access. For example, an
analysis tool that performs computational analysis on
elements of the building and stores results back in
the BIM comes under this category. Command and
control type systems will use BIMs as a tool and issue
control commands to linked subsystems based on spatial
relationships of resources and systems. These systems
can also issue commands to external systems to bring
in information updates, such as sensor data.
The concept of using a building information model
as a unied interface and data repository for dierent
subsystems is central to leveraging BIM for facilities
management. As we have noted, the spatial context
provided by the BIM can make previously independent
subsystems easier for users to interact with. For
example, a CCTV camera feed could be accessed by
clicking on a camera icon on a oor plan. However, not
every system or user needs to be given access to every
information feed when they have access to the BIM
- the security policy may restrict access to data from
CCTV camera feeds to on-duty security operators who
are present in the control room. Further, the policy may
authorise remote CCTV access to emergency response
ocials but only when the system recognises that an
emergency has been declared. Users who hold the role
of computer technician can be granted access to view
only the CCTV feeds for the server rooms by selecting
the relevant rooms on the visual map. The BIM stores
information on which individual cameras are in each
room and the low level access privileges can be compiled
from this spatial context. This same principle can
be applied for access control to other types of logical
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resources that have a spatial context.
Clearly, the resources and information that can be
accessed via a BIM vary in sensitivity and the BIM
authorisation system needs to be able to record and
enforce complex access rules as our examples have
illustrated. Unfortunately, current BIM tools and BIM
servers implement only the most basic access control
features if any at all. Model development tools from
commercial vendors such as Autodesk do implement
some role-based access controls but these are focused
on the design phase, not a building's operational phases
that are the principal concern of our framework.
4.2. Access control for external resources
In this category, we are focused on controlling access
to systems and resources that are outside the BIM,
but we wish to leverage the spatial information in
the BIM to express and enforce the policies (access
rules). Thus, access control for external resources
includes logical access to information systems and
information resources, and physical access to physical
objects and locations, all connected within a spatial
and logical context via a BIM. This context information
is used in access control decision making. As we will
discuss shortly, this approach enables the integration of
physical access control with logical access control which
yields a number of security-related advantages.
Plant, equipment, machines, etc. in a facility are
increasingly computerised and managed via process
control hardware and software (e.g., Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition or SCADA) over internet-
connected networks. They are evolving to have many of
the characteristics of traditional software applications.
Though their authorisation capabilities are relatively
immature [31] some can distinguish dierent users and
grant them specic access privileges. For improved
eciency and security, these disparate systems need to
be managed in a unied way.
Computerisation and network-based control makes it
possible to access systems remotely. This increases the
likelihood that they will be maliciously attacked. For
example, a disgruntled ex-employee may be able operate
or disable equipment via an internet connection to cause
damage or nancial loss to the organisation [32]. To
combat remote access threats, certain types of access
need to be restricted, for example, on the basis of the
location of the resource and the user. Even if a user
has been granted access privileges to a control system
(e.g., HVAC, lighting, waste water) the security policy
may stipulate that they need to be physically present
in a particular location to execute critical functions. So
the maintenance electrician Eddie may be permitted
to monitor equipment status remotely, but he must
be physically present in the control room to issue
shutdown commands. The integration of physical and
logical access control and a spatial model can allow
this condition to be enforced. The framework can
verify if the user has entered the designated space via
the physical access control subsystem, before granting
access to the information system.
4.3. Access control administration
Creating access control policies is a critical task in any
authorisation system. The use of multiple attributes
such as spatial, temporal, and other constraints makes
access control rules complex to dene, maintain and
audit. We propose a mechanism that utilises BIM and
its spatial model to make this process more intuitive for
privilege administrators.
Consider our example in Section 2, where Alice needs
to congure access to a new employee joining their
division. She has already dened the spaces occupied
by her division and, based on geometric reasoning,
the system has computed the other zones and doors
that must be accessible to reach that space with the
least privilege required. These spaces can be referred
to in access policies via a logical tag e.g., Finance
Division Zone. Alice simply needs to assign the new
employee the role of Finance Division member and the
authorisation framework will utilise the relationships
in the BIM to assign the required ne-grained access
privileges to the new employee. This can be done
automatically via a rule that says nance sta can
access the nance zone. Our approach to spatial policy
creation, visualisation and enforcement gives greater
assurance that high-level security policies are correctly
implemented.
Dynamic generation of access control privileges is
a desired feature of an authorisation framework. For
example, Bob can assign Eddie for repairs to dierent
parts of the building each day via individual jobs
generated through an asset management system linked
to the BIM. The location of the eected equipment and
the status of the jobs can be used to automatically
assign and revoke physical access privileges in the
PACS.
Access control policy visualisation provides a visual
representation of authorisation policies. The system
operators will be able to visualise the access possibilities
for a user or a group of users using the spatial model.
For example, ne-grained physical access control rules,
which determine whether a user is able to open a
particular door, can be geometrically analysed and
displayed graphically on a oor plan of the building to
visualise the areas of the facility that are accessible to
a particular employee.
The ability to visualise access control policies is
essential for simulating emergencies and evacuation
plans [33, 34]. Access control patterns change during
an evacuation event and physical access control to doors
and control spaces are recongured to enable emergency
response and recovery. The ability to test policies
for these dierent scenarios is useful in eliminating
unwanted access situations. This can be used in
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conjunction with an emergency response subsystem and
assist emergency response teams in planning.
5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A
BIM-BASED AUTHORISATION FRAME-
WORK
In this section, we introduce the key requirements for
an authorisation framework using building information
models.
Spatial data model: The main aspect of an
authorisation framework using building information
models would be the ability of using it as a spatial
data model. It is required to provide the vocabulary
for naming these entities of dierent types in a spatial
context in access control policies and for decision-
making functions. The data model should also include
semantics for operations on these objects, including
spatial operations that can complement the core
decision-making process.
Objects: An authorisation framework for buildings
must enforce access control for physical spaces, physical
objects, and logical objects. These resources could have
a variety of groupings based on feature type, object
content, metadata, and spatial position. In addition,
the same authorisation mechanisms should be able to
access control data contained with building information
models. The authorisation framework could utilise the
same policies and decision-making processes as it relies
on the same data model to provide the vocabulary.
Subjects: Access control enforcement should take into
consideration the organisational functions performed
by users. The system should have the capability to
specify rules based on conceptual groupings of users
that are based on their organisational functions or
roles. In such an authorisation framework used in
large facilities it is desirable to have role based access
control (RBAC) [35] capabilities. Subjects should also
have additional attributes, such as current location for
human users and these locations can point back to an
entity in the spatial data model.
Policy: A range of dierent contextual factors should
be specied in the authorisation policies for operations
that can be executed on the controlled resources.
Attributes such as user location, time of request,
resource type, resource location, and access mode could
be used in specifying rules for access control. The main
vocabulary of the policies will be derived from objects
of the spatial data model.
Authorisation policies that dene the access privi-
leges should be activated or deactivated by event trig-
gers to handle emergency scenarios and event response.
These policies should dynamically change the accessi-
bility of protected resources in such events. However,
basic security and privacy requirements should be en-
forced at all times. Policies must be auditable to ensure
no errors or inconsistencies are present that can lead to
unintended access or violation of constraints. Any dis-
closure of additional data or any provision of additional
access must be made on a need-to-know basis. To en-
sure that the authorisation system can be managed ef-
ciently, roles, resources and spaces should be arranged
in hierarchies so that policies can specify constraints at
varying granularities.
Decision-making: The policy-reasoning component
of an authorisation framework is a decision-making
point for access requests. Access control decisions
made by the framework should be based on multiple
attributes of the subject, object, action, and the
environment. Access privileges assigned to a user and
the function to enable and disable them must be based
on a combined spatial and temporal approach delivering
dynamic spatiotemporal permission assignment. This
may also include awareness of the state of execution of
a structured workow or business process.
Spatial awareness: The decision making point should
be able to interpret user location and resource location
from the spatial data model, and it must be able to
utilise spatial functions that operate on these objects
in the decision making process. The spatial data
model and an associated spatial reasoning component
should provide spatial functions such as containment,
connectivity, and accessibility that operate on objects
contained within the spatial data model.
Interoperability: The authorisation framework should
be interoperable with multiple subsystems. It should be
possible to integrate geospatial data from heterogeneous
sources in a secure fashion. The access control features
enforced by this framework should complement any
existing security mechanisms of the subsystems. The
authorisation framework should act as an additional
layer on top of these systems that can run on dierent
technologies. The individual subsystems can implement
their own security policies to protect their data. Thus,
policy interoperability is an important consideration in
achieving interoperability between multiple subsystems.
Attributes and targets of the policies should be
interpreted consistently and any mismatch of policy rule
semantics and rules avoided.
Integrity: Integrity of data should be ensured, when
it is resourced from and managed by third party
entities. This is essential when dierent subsystems
are integrated. Privacy is also a greater concern in
data ow among multiple subsystems. It should be
able to control and enforce access rules across existing
physical access control system from dierent vendors.
The spatial location coordinates should be independent
of the devices used to capture them. The use of logical
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representations for physical locations or zones should be
supported to present a unied location representation,
which is essential for interoperability between multiple
subsystems. The visualisation of the spatial data should
take into consideration the possibilities of inference
when the absence of certain elements could imply the
existence of something sensitive.
6. FEATURES OF SPATIOTEMPORAL AC-
CESS CONTROL MODELS
In this section, we describe and discuss features
relevant to access control models in the context of
spatiotemporal authorisations and building information
models. Similar to [36], we identify and discuss features
in terms of uniqueness, relevance, shortcomings, and
other issues. We summarise the key features of these
access control models in Table 1. These features
form the basis for of our analysis of noteworthy
spatiotemporal access control models will be discussed
in detail in Section 7. The following sections describe
key features that we have used for a conceptual
comparison of spatiotemporal access control models.
6.1. Formal foundation
The role of access control systems is to enforce an
organisation's security policies. The security-sensitive
nature of access control often motivates authors to
present a mathematically precise description of their
model to support claims about its capabilities. The
formal presentation of a model denes its entities
and operations and a range of underlying descriptive
formalisms can be found in the literature, with set
theory being a popular choice. The formalism used
to describe a model does not need to be the same as
that used in actual decision making. For example,
GSTRBAC [41] uses set theory to dene the model and
predicate logic to dene access policies and implement
authorisation decision making.
6.2. Support for role-based access control
It is desirable to use role based access control [44] for
spatial authorisation frameworks when they are used
in large organisations. In such systems, permissions
can be associated with roles based on organisational
functions performed by users. By centralising the
administration of permissions for large number of users
this can eectively reduce errors and redundancy.
Many of the spatiotemporal access control models use
the conceptual foundation of RBAC to achieve these
requirements. The notion of role in RBAC is extended
to spatial role, temporal role and spatiotemporal role
in some of these models. They also use the concepts
of role activation and deactivation, role hierarchy and
other role based relationships. It has been argued that
RBAC has a number of advantages over other models of
access control, particularly in simplifying authorisation
administration [35]. Here we discuss RBAC as a feature
for spatiotemporal access control models.
Four modular variations of RBAC can be identied
based on their functional capabilities [44]. RBAC0
represents essential RBAC capabilities including roles,
user-role assignments, and permission-role assignments.
In large organisational settings, RBAC roles can
have capabilities that are overlapping where users of
dierent roles with common permissions. It would
be inecient to have these permissions for each role
assignments and many RBAC models implement the
concept of role hierarchies. RBAC1 adds the support
for role hierarchies to at RBAC0 as a partial order
relationship between roles [45]. RBAC1 denes a
seniority relationship between roles through hierarchies
and permissions are inherited among roles.
Separation of Duty (SoD) is considered a fundamen-
tal principle in computer security that guarantees major
errors do not occur without intentional consent of mul-
tiple users [46]. Users of dierent functions are assigned
to specic tasks to minimise collusions. RBAC2 enables
separation of duty relations for RBAC [47]. RBAC2
supports both static and dynamic SoD. Role constraints
are evaluated against user role assignments in static
SoD, whereas in dynamic SoD it is against the set of
roles activated for the user in the active session.
The fully featured RBAC model, incorporating
RBAC0, RBAC1, and RBAC2 is identied as RBAC3.
Many of the spatiotemporal access control models use
the conceptual foundation of RBAC in one of the
variations. The notion of role in RBAC is extended
to spatial role, temporal role and spatiotemporal role
in some of these models. They also use the concepts
of role activation and deactivation, role hierarchy and
other role based relationships.
Even though RBAC has many advantages, it can be
challenging to apply in many real world settings. A
notable criticism is that it is dicult to setup an initial
role hierarchy and assign coherent and correct sets of
privileges to individual roles [48]. In addition, roles need
to be under a single administrative domain or have a
consistent denition across multiple domains for proper
operation of RBAC. Thus using RBAC with distributed
applications is challenging. Furthermore, many real-
world applications, including the BIM-based scenarios
we have described, require access restrictions imposed
not only based on roles, but also considering other
dynamic, context-dependent criteria. With traditional
RBAC, access decisions do not consider factors such as
user location, resource location or system time, which
may be as important as roles for access decision-making
in some settings. A number of proposals have been
published that aim to address this issue by making
RBAC more context-aware through the addition of
context attributes to decision making [48]. These
models are discussed in the following sections.
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specication






Yes, in later pro-
posals
No No No Yes
Multiple policy
integration
No No No No No No Yes
Physical
access control
Possible No Possible Possible Yes Possible Possible
Logical
access control
Possible Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Possible
TABLE 1. Summary of Access Control Model Features
6.3. Spatial data model
Spatial access control is based on the spatial context
of resources and requesters. A data model is required
to provide spatial context to all entities concerned with
the authorisation system. Access control policies will
be dened using spatial specications of the spatial
data model. Authorisation decision-making procedure
will use the spatial data model to make access control
decisions based on access policies.
Spatial data models used in access control models
can be based on basic geometrical coordinates as in
STRBAC, or vector based reference models such as in
GSAM. A majority of the existing spatial access control
models use three point coordinate systems as the spatial
base. The combination of vector maps with digital
raster images is commonly used in many geospatial
applications. It is desirable to have a exible data
model such as a building information model that can
streamline spatial data management. It is also desirable
for this data model to be standards compliant to achieve
interoperability between dierent systems associated
with the authorisation system.
For instance, when analysing access between rooms,
the thickness of walls is not a major concern. The
concern is about openings in walls (ie doors and
windows) and access control through these openings.
For security analysis purposes, we normally only need
the rooms (spaces) themselves and the boundaries
between them (Figure 3). These spatial association
information from the spatial data model can be used
in the access control process.
FIGURE 3. Multiple Space Boundaries
6.4. Spatial granularity
Authorisation systems are required to provide access
control at dierent levels or granularity. Many real
world entities can be mapped spatially at dierent
levels such as a town, block, building, oor, room,
and even individual elements. Based on the level of
control required the access control system needs to
address protected elements at varying levels of spatial
granularity.
A spatial hierarchy of protected objects simplies the
policy denition process, where permissions assigned
to higher-level objects can be derived at lower levels.
For example, a geospatial system using raster image
maps for its spatial representation can generate maps
at dierent resolutions and with dierent sets of
object overlays based on the access control decision.
Some access control systems simply rely on geometric
coordinates and others use multi-level logical locations.
The concept of logical locations maps a real world
spatial entity through a mapping function to an entity
in the selected data model. This can provide exibility
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in dening and processing access control policies. For
example, a controlled door to a secure server room
can be represented by its three-dimensional coordinates
(x,y,z). This can be mapped to a physical location using
a mapping functionm that converts the coordinates to a
logical representation of type room, and subtype secure
area. The inverse mapping function m' can be used to
convert logical locations into physical coordinates.
The degree of spatial granularity can have both a
positive and negative inuence on the eciency of
decision making and the expressiveness authorisation
policies. A ner level of granularity ensures that it
is possible to express a wide range of access rules and
associated constraints. This can also lead to increased
searching and processing time for access control policies
and decision-making, which can negatively inuence the
real-time performance of the authorisation system.
6.5. Temporal constraints
Many organisational functions can have limited or
periodic temporal duration and resources have temporal
limitation on availability. Therefore, access control
to resources needs to have a temporal dimension in
decision-making. The need for expressing authorisation
rules on the basis of temporal relationships in
real-life situations has been recognised by other
researchers [49, 50, 51]. Temporal dependencies allow
the derivation of new authorisations based on the
presence or absence of other authorisations in given
time intervals [50]. Authorisation rules can specify
a start and an expiration time. Both negative
and positive authorisations can be specied explicitly
or derived through rules [52]. Periodic temporal
intervals are used to grant and revoke authorisations
automatically [53].
6.6. Policy specication
Policy specication concerns how policies are expressed.
The common policy specication approaches for
spatiotemporal access control systems include sets,
logic-based languages, graph theory and combinations
of these. Access control models such as GSAM
and STRBAC, which are dened using set theory,
rely on sets for policy specication. XML based
mark-up languages can be used in access control
frameworks for policy specication. XACML and
GeoXACML use logic-based authorisation languages
for policy specication. These logic-based languages
can improve the process of verication, modication,
and enforcement of policies, because of their formal
foundations and expressiveness [54].
6.7. Policy administration
Policy administration is the task of creating and main-
taining access control policies by security administra-
tors. In large organisational environment, a proper ad-
ministration mechanism of complex access control poli-
cies is a critical aspect of any authorisation system.
It is required to ensure the specic intentions of secu-
rity administrators are rightly reected in the access
policies. Such large organisations can have thousands
of users, roles, and resources and their access control
policies can dene large number of complex and ne-
grained rights that are managed by dierent adminis-
trators [55]. In addition to these complexities, spatial
authorisation systems have another dimension of spatial
roles, resources and rights, which makes policy admin-
istration even complex [56]. Thus, policy administra-
tion is an important feature to consider in reviewing
spatiotemporal access control model. The task of con-
structing and maintaining such complex access control
policies is non-trivial and proper tools and mechanisms
are needed. Most of the spatiotemporal access control
models we have reviewed do not incorporate policy ad-
ministration in their initial proposals. However, this
need is commonly identied later and some models have
later extensions that provide policy administration [57].
6.8. Multiple policy integration
It is necessary to achieve integration of access control
policies when multiple organisational divisions are com-
bined under one authorisation domain or multiple sub-
systems are integrated into a larger system. This in-
tegration process must combine independently dened
policies from dierent divisions, while ensuring inde-
pendence and administrative autonomy [54]. Policies
from dierent authorities must be integrated and en-
forced without ambiguity in an enterprise-wide authori-
sation framework. This means that the policy language
must support a range of strategies for resolving conicts
between the decisions generated by dierent individual
policies since one may permit while another denies.
The process of policy integration is inuenced by the
policy specication mechanism of each subsystem. It
is desirable to have a uniform policy specication stan-
dard across all systems, but this is not practical as it is
largely dependent on vendor technology and the need
to accommodate legacy systems. Logic based policy
specication can support policy integration using oper-
ators such as addition, conjunction, negation, closure,
scoping restriction, overriding, and template [58]. For
example, the conjunction operator merges and returns
the intersection of two policies.
6.9. Physical access control
Physical access control regulates access to physical
spaces within a facility. It can be enforced by
controlling individual portals such as doors leading to
the specied space. As we have argued in Section 1.3,
there are benets in a converged approach to access
control where the same authorisation framework can be
applied across logical resources and physical resources.
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However, the existing spatial access control models
are not designed to handle this scenario directly in
their implementations. In some cases, where they do
not distinguish between logical and physical resources
it is possible to simulate and extend the models to
support physical access control. In general, this is
a feature lacking in authorisation systems, including
spatiotemporal systems.
6.10. Logical access control
Logical access control regulates access to information
objects and information services provided through com-
puterised information systems. In spatial authorisation,
logical resources include the elements of a building in-
formation model, spatial maps, data, and information
sourced from other connected systems with spatial con-
text such as CCTV camera feeds. Logical access control
is the main focus of the existing spatiotemporal access
control models. While some of these systems focus on
protecting spatial information contained within maps,
others focus on protecting all types of data with spatial
context.
7. REVIEW OF SPATIOTEMPORAL AC-
CESS CONTROL MODELS
In this section, we review a collection of spatial access
control models against the model features identied in
Section 6 and the requirements identied in Section 5.
We cover six systems in some detail: GRBAC, GSAM,
GEO-RBAC, STRBAC, GSTRBAC, and ESTARBAC.
We focus on these models because they represent a
variety of approaches to spatial authorisation. We also
include the GeoXACML standard to this discussion,
which has capabilities for declaration and enforcement
of geo-specic access restrictions. We are interested in
its policy framework and capability of integrating access
control policies from multiple stakeholder systems.
7.1. GRBAC
Generalised role-based access control (GRBAC) is an
early role-based access control model that introduced
the concept of environment roles as distinct from
subject roles [37]. Any system state that can be
collected by the system can be an environment role
in GRBAC. An environment role can be based on
temporal context such as time of day or day of the week,
or location context such as ground oor of the building
or third room on the rst oor. The environment roles
in GRBAC and the subject roles in RBAC have similar
properties including role activation, role hierarchy, and
separation of duty. These roles can be activated based
on the current environment context.
GRBAC can be seen as one of the initial
spatiotemporal access control models. It covers the
access control problem as for logical or physical
resources. These concepts can be extended to
both physical and logical access control to achieve a
converged approach. GRBAC lacks a spatial data
model, and serves only as a higher-level model for
spatiotemporal authorisation. The model specication
is very abstract with no formal foundation. It does not
provide any specics on authorisation rule denition,
or spatiotemporal constraints for environment roles.
GRBAC does not address many of the higher-
level requirements such as event triggers, granular
rule specication, or policy interoperability between
multiple systems. Some of these shortcomings of
GRBAC were addressed by later models that we discuss
in this section.
7.2. GSAM
The Geo-Spatial Data Authorisation Model (GSAM)
proposed by Atluri and Chun is another pioneering work
in considering the combined impact of location and time
in authorisation decision making [38]. GSAM provides
protection mechanisms that address issues specic to
spatial imagery data stored in spatial databases i.e.,
Geographic Information Systems (GIS).
GSAM evaluates requests to display or manipulate
spatial data and makes authorisation decisions which
may involve rendering maps at dierent detail levels
based on criteria such as authorised subjects, objects,
and spatiotemporal constraints. GSAM supports
privilege modes specic to geospatial data (e.g., zoom-
in, overlay, identify, animate and y-by) and includes
geometric considerations such as the region of overlap
in access requests and authorisation. It supports
geospatial and credential type hierarchies that can be
used to specify authorisations and individual identities
or geospatial objects can inherit permissions and
obligations. GSAM makes authorisation decisions
based on spatial extent, temporal duration, map image
resolution and other spatiotemporal attributes.
GSAM does not provide mechanisms to extend the
authorisation mechanism to other object types such
as physical objects or logical system resources. Thus,
in the form described, it cannot be directly used in
conjunction with other physical or logical access control
systems, though its general concepts may be adapted.
The temporal aspect of authorisation in GSAM is
limited to the temporal terms attached to the map
data. It does not use the temporal conditions of the
access requests in decision-making. The limitations in
role-based access control and specifying organisational
roles without geographical constraints limit the use of
GSAM in many environments. The lack of standards
in authorisation specication can cause interoperability
issues with multiple systems and supporting other
features like policy migration and cross verication.
7.3. GEO-RBAC
Bertino et al. proposed the GEO-RBAC model[39],
extending RBAC with a spatial model compliant with
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the OGC (Open GeoSpatial Consortium) simple feature
geometric model [59]. GEO-RBAC is formally dened
using the principles of set theory and uses contextual
information such as user position with the concept of
spatial role to make access control decisions.
GEO-RBAC is based on a reference geometric model,
spatially aware objects, spatial roles, and a position
model. The reference geometric model is based on the
OGC simple feature geometric model. An object can be
composed by one or more point, line, or polygon types
and dierent topological relations can be applied to the
objects in the reference model. This gives the ability of
specifying objects at dierent granularities.
The position model assigns users logical positions
that are device/technology independent, based on
their real positions using specic mapping functions.
For example, a real-time location device carried by
an employee can transmit their location as three-
dimensional coordinates, which can be mapped to a
specic room, which is identied by its logical label in
the position model. The granularity of these logical
positions can depend on the spatial role played by the
user.
A spatial role in GEO-RBAC represents a geographi-
cally bounded organisational function, with a role name
and spatial boundaries dened by a spatial extent. For
uniformity, this model considers non-spatial roles as a
subset of spatial roles having the full reference space
as role extent. The basic access control concepts of
GEO-RBAC for logical resources can be extended to
physical access control. Prox-RBAC, an extension of
GEO-RBAC, introduces proximity constrains into spa-
tial authorisation syntax with continuity of usage [60].
This is particularly relevant to buildings as the concepts
proposed in Prox-RBAC are more specic for an indoor
space model.
GEO-RBAC supports role schema and role instance
hierarchies that enable inheritance of permissions,
user assignments, and activations between roles. It
also uses constrained RBAC that extends standard
separation of duty constraints for specic characteristics
of GEO-RBAC, such as dierent granularity and spatial
dimension [61].
Temporal access control is a vital requirement in
many applications but GEO-RBAC lacks a temporal
capability. This limitation is addressed by later
spatiotemporal access control models. GEO-RBAC
does not use any policy specication standard,
which could make interoperability dicult. Policy
administration is also not part of GEO-RBAC but later
proposals address this issue by extending with GEO-
RBAC Admin [56, 57, 62]. GEO-RBAC also lacks some
of the important requirements, such as multiple object
attributes, and policy integration.
7.4. STRBAC
Ray and Toahchoodee formalised a spatiotemporal
RBAC model, called STRBAC [40] that considers the
interaction of location and time contexts with the
classical RBAC components in access control decision-
making. STRBAC is formally dened using set theory.
Access control permissions are expressed via multiple
set relations.
STRBAC does not provide any formal denition of a
spatial model, but it is assumed that controlled objects
will have devices that transmit location information.
It uses the physical location and logical location
concept, where physical locations are real-world three
dimensional coordinates, and logical locations are
their symbolic representations, such as rooms and
oors. Mapping functions are used to convert between
the location representations. STRBAC uses two
temporal information types: a discrete point in time is
represented by a time instant and a set of time instances
are grouped into a time interval. This enables the use
of dierent semantics in dening temporal constraints.
Spatiotemporal permissions in STRBAC can be asso-
ciated with roles, objects, and operations. Spatiotem-
poral constraints can be expressed on role activation,
role hierarchy, separation of duty, user-role assignment
and role-permission assignment. STRBAC supports
multiple role hierarchies for permission inheritance and
role activation. Each of these can be unrestricted,
time restricted, location restricted, and time-location
restricted. STRBAC can control access to physical and
logical objects. It assumes every logical object is con-
tained within a physical object, such as a computer.
Access control to physical spaces can also be achieved
by making an access door the controlled physical object.
STRBAC uses sessions to enable pervasive computing
requirements. In this mode of operation, sessions are
associated with locations and time durations in which
roles can be activated [63].
STRBAC does not dene any specic spatial data
model, making the model specication more abstract
without any details for location representations. This
model is proposed for computing environments with
a single administrative authority. Thus it does
not address the possibility of multiple authorisation
domains or policy integration requirements.
7.5. GSTRBAC
GSTRBAC is a formal framework for specication
and verication of spatiotemporal role-based access
control proposed by Samuel, Ghafoor and Bertino [41].
It incorporates topological spatial constraints to the
existing GTRBAC model [64]. Both logical and
physical access control are possible in GSTRBAC.
GSTRBAC is formally dened using set theory and
predicate logic. The spatiotemporal authorisation func-
tions in GSTRBAC use logic operations for decision
making. GSTRBAC uses a lightweight formal mod-
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elling language, Alloy, for its policy specication frame-
work. This includes policy composition, visualisation,
and conict resolution processes. It enables the policy
administrator to validate policies before implementa-
tion.
GSTRBAC uses spatial constraints in role enabling,
user-role assignment, role-permission assignment, and
role activation. The spatial constraints are based
on physical locations and virtual locations, but the
model does not specify any spatial data model for
these locations. It evaluates constraint expressions in
the temporal domain to make access control decisions.
However, the permissions do not have a spatiotemporal
context. GSTRBAC introduces the concept of spatial
separation of duty constraints, preventing a user from
activating multiple roles simultaneously based on where
the role is activated. The spatial role hierarchy enables
permission inheritance based on the role activation
location.
7.6. ESTARBAC
The Spatiotemporal Role Based Access Control
(STARBAC) [65] model proposed by Aich, Sural and
Majumdar covers the fundamental requirements for
access control with conditions in both space and time
domains. It is based on propositional logic and uses
logical operations on various spatiotemporal commands
for access control evaluation. The Enhanced STARBAC
(ESTARBAC) [42] extends the capabilities of the
STARBAC model. It includes the concept of spatial
separation of duty and algorithms for access control
evaluation, which are not part of STARBAC.
ESTARBAC is formally dened using set theory and
set operations. Spatiotemporal evaluation functions
are also used in access control decision making.
ESTARBAC does not use any standard spatial
data model. It supports dierent granularities of
spatiotemporal attributes. A physical point is the
fundamental spatial unit and a collection of physical
points is dened as a logical location. A time instant is
the fundamental time unit and periodic expressions are
used to specify temporal authorisation rules.
In ESTARBAC subjects, objects, and permissions
can be associated with a spatiotemporal extent. An
entity in the spatiotemporal domain conned in a
spatiotemporal zone is referred to as a spatiotemporal
extent. Access control policies in ESTARBAC
are dened using role extent and permission extent
constraints. A role extent combines organisational role
with spatiotemporal extent and a permission extent
combines organisational capability with spatiotemporal
extent. A user can activate a role and can execute
any permission available to the role only when the
role extent and permission extent satisfy the user's
spatiotemporal extent.
ESTARBAC uses XML for policy specication and
uses a policy loader for loading and processing policies
into the system. This standardised approach for
policy specication allows the model to implement
some important requirements, such as interoperability,
multiple policy integration, and policy integrity
evaluation. However, as proposed, ESTARBAC is
intended for use under a single policy administrative
point, and integration of policies from multiple entities
is not part of the model specication. The access-
controlled objects are limited to logical objects with
spatiotemporal context. It is possible to extend this
model to support access control for physical objects and
physical spaces.
7.7. GeoXACML
Geospatial eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (GeoXACML) denes a geospatial extension to
the XACML standard by OASIS. Matheus [66] pre-
sented an approach for the declaration of spatial, class-
based, and object-based access restrictions using the
XACML standard specically for geospatial applica-
tions. This was later standardised by the Open Geospa-
tial Consortium (OGC) as the Geospatial eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language Encoding Standard
(GeoXACML) [43]. Spatial data types and spatial au-
thorisation decision functions based on the OGC Sim-
ple Features and GML standards are incorporated into
XACML with this extension.
The spatial model of GeoXACML is based on
the OGC simple Feature Access Geometry Class
Model. This enables interoperability with the OpenGIS
web services standard. GeoXACML denes uniform
resource names according to the XACML extension
points to incorporate geometric attribute values.
Multiple levels of GML geometry types are used for
the geometric attribute values[67], including Point,
LineString, Polygon, MultiPoint, MultiLineString, and
MultiPolygon.
GeoXACML policy language can be used to declare
complex spatial restrictions with rule constructs. Com-
plex constraints between permission geometry and the
resource object's geometries can be expressed through
spatial conditions. The GeoXACML specication does
not provide any formalisation of the standard. How-
ever, it should be possible to apply the Defeasible De-
scription Logics based formalisation of XACML[68] to
GeoXACML, as both standards follow the same autho-
risation principles. An authorisation decision in GeoX-
ACML is made by traversing policy trees and using
rule-combining algorithms. Logic operators are used
to combine the outcome of subroutine rule constructs
into single access decision. Integration of policies from
external namespaces is an integral part of XACML and
the same is available in GeoXACML.
GeoXACML is dierent from the other access
control models discussed before. It is essentially
a policy language and implementation framework.
It can be congured to support dierent modes of
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spatiotemporal access control to both physical and
logical resources. GeoXACML also supports the
XACML RBAC Prole [69] extension that supports
the notion of roles for RBAC models that includes
support for hierarchical and constrained RBAC.
XACML also has a published specication for policy
administration and delegation. There is also a
GeoXACML specic layered administration model for
distributed administration of complex spatial access
control policies [55].
7.8. Summary of review
We have analysed some of the important spatiotemporal
authorisation models in this section. Each of these
models has dierent strengths and weaknesses as shown
in Table 1, allowing them to satisfy dierent sets
of requirements. We have identied the important
shortcomings of these models particularly in relation to
an authorisation framework using building information
models.
A building information model can provide granular
information about the relationships between controlled
building elements. The notion of adjacent spaces and
ow analysis of controlled spaces can be performed
by utilising building information models. Most of the
access control models we have discussed do not use
any spatial data model that has as rich an information
set as a building information model. GSAM is a
notable exception that uses a richer spatial data model,
which is a combination of vector data maps and raster
image maps. These vector data maps are conceptually
similar to building information models, but on a larger
scale with lesser details of individual buildings. The
use of logical object hierarchies with physical spatial
attributes is the common approach in most of these
systems. Even though some of these processes can
be performed using basic spatial functions, the use
of building information models can give more native
approach to the problem.
Policy specication is another important element
in access control. It is necessary to have a
formalised policy specication mechanism to integrate
systems from dierent vendors under the same
authorisation framework. GSTRBAC and ESTARBAC
use standardised approaches to policy specication, but
they do not elaborate on policy integration issues.
The GeoXACML policy framework encapsulates the
requirements of policy integration. With the exception
of GeoXACML, none of the existing spatiotemporal
access control models addresses the need for policy
integration, in terms of multi-level policy specication
or multivendor subsystems.
Spatial visualisation and evaluation of access control
policies can improve the reliability and integrity of the
access control framework. A well-structured spatial
model is necessary to achieve these requirements. It
is possible to implement some of these requirements on
top of some of these models. However, the authorisation
framework and spatial model must be closely coupled
to use two-way information sharing, which can deliver
advantages at multiple levels. Most of these access
control models do not provide converged access control
natively. They are designed either for logical access
control or for physical access control.
In the next section, we propose an authorisation
framework incorporating a building information model
to address the main issues identied.
8. AUTHORISATION USING BIMS
In this section, we present our conceptual model for an
integrated authorisation framework, shown in Figure 4.
This functions as an overarching access control system
for BIM elements, internal resources, and external
resources. This authorisation framework will utilise
building information models in three key stages of
access control: policy design, policy management, and
decision-making. Each of these processes use dierent
set of components of the authorisation framework
along with BIMs to achieve desired results. The
following subsection provides a brief description of each
component and later we discuss how each of them














































FIGURE 4. Conceptual model of the proposed
authorisation framework
8.1. External modules
The authorisation framework will rely on the following
external modules for spatial and BIM related operations
and these modules must be implemented to an
acceptable industry standard.
8.1.1. BIM / Model Server:
The BIM layer consists of BIMs that are loaded into
a model server. The BIM les originate from multiple
stakeholders of the facility that are converged into one
BIM in the model server. The BIMs in the model
server are continuously updated with any changes and
modications to the building. The model server can
always provide current version of BIM to external
systems including the authorisation framework.
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8.1.2. Spatial Reasoning:
The spatial reasoning module provides the spatial rea-
soning functions required for authorisation framework.
The BIM analysis tool analyses BIM data and provides
computational results at dierent points of the autho-
risation procedure. This includes dierent spatial func-
tions such as locating access doors to a space, reachabil-
ity analysis based a specied starting and ending points,
or obtaining the list of temperature sensors contained
within a given space. Referring back to our example
scenario, spatial reasoning would be used when assign-
ing a contracted technician for a maintenance job by
identifying the doors that leads to the location of the
malfunction and granting required physical access.
8.1.3. Visualisation Engine:
The visualisation engine will generate 3D and 2D
representations of BIM data to be used by dierent
processes of the authorisation framework such as spatial
reasoning and policy transformation. This module will
also act as the enforcement point for access control
over the BIM elements in visualisation. This can also
act as an interface for the users to interact with the
building information model at dierent stages of the
authorisation process, such as policy creation based on
visual representation and policy simulation and testing.
For example, this module can be utilised to visualise
access control policies overlayed on BIM visualisation
or generate visualisations for the policy transformation
module. The command and control operators would be
able to use visualisations of BIMs to control all aspects
of building operations including granting and revoking
access to users.
8.2. Authorisation framework modules
The authorisation framework is conceptually divided
into two layers. The authorisation layer includes a
Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Administration
Point (PAP), and Policy Information Point (PIP). This
layer adopts the XACML architecture [70] with the
main extensions to the XACML standard relating to the
additional spatial capabilities of the PDP. The access
layer provides service interfaces to external systems to
provide and manage access control functions, to both
logical and physical resources.
8.2.1. PAP:
The PAP stores and manages policies generated from
the policy transformation module. This will be used by
the administrators to maintain desired access rights for
in a set of policies. It provides managed policies to the
PDP for access decision making.
8.2.2. PIP:
The PIP provides external information for access
decision-making. This includes information from
external sources, such as the spatial reasoning module
and other subsystems. The spatial reasoning functions
will be provided through an external service to
the authorisation framework and it will require an
intermediate translation point.
8.2.3. PDP:
A BIM-aware PDP will be able to evaluate access
control rules with BIM attributes and spatial functions.
This will be in extension of the standard XACML
PDP by implementing functionality that would allow
making authorisation decisions from BIM specic access
restrictions.
8.2.4. Policy Transformation:
The policy transformation module functions as the
central entity to generate platform independent access
control policies with a spatial dimension for the
authorisation framework. It will utilise spatial
reasoning to derive the necessary access privileges based
on a given criteria. For example, the administrator
can grant physical access to a specic space in the
building by selecting the initial point of entry and the
target space on the BIM visualisation. The spatial
reasoning module can analyse the possibility of access
between these two points and identify the controlled
doors that need to be given access. The transformation
module can also identify any conicts such as the need
to pass through an area that requires higher access
clearance. The policy transformation module also
provides the means to transform and translate high-
level platform independent access control policies to the
specic formats used by dierent sub-systems, such as
a proprietary physical access control system.
8.2.5. Access Control Interface:
The Access Control Interface will provide access control
decision-making capabilities to external systems. Sub-
systems can use the authorisation framework through
this interface to make access control decisions that can
then be enforced within the systems. The authorisa-
tion framework will be able to handle access requests
for both logical and physical resources, thus it provides
a unied interface to dierent systems.
8.2.6. Access Information Interface:
An access information interface will be used to enable
external decision making with BIM knowledge. There
will be systems that use their own access decision
making, such as a proprietary physical access control
system. These systems can also use some components
of the authorisation layer as external services. For
example, an external application can utilise the spatial
functions for its own authorisation decision making.
A physical access control system that uses its own
decision-making functionalities can still use the spatial
capabilities and unied policies from the authorisation
framework.
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8.3. Access control processes
Building information models and associated capabilities
can provide new possibilities in three distinct stages
of access control. Here we discuss how the framework
components interact in each access control process.
8.3.1. Access control policy design
Access control policy design is the process where a
security ocer of a facility or anyone with delegated
privileges creates access control policies that specify
which users can access which objects under which
conditions and perform which actions. In a simplied
form, this can be represented as a quadruple of subject-
object-action-condition relationship.
Building information models provide the vocabulary
for annotating objects and actions in access control
policies. Each object within a building will have a
corresponding element in BIM. These BIM objects will
also hold attributes that specify actions that can be
performed on these objects. For example, the entrance
door to a room will be represented in the BIM by a
`door' object with action attributes `open' and `close'.
Additionally there can be `conditions' that are based on
spatial functions such as connectivity and containment,
which require BIMs to specify and compute results.
Building information models also provide a visual
user interface for policy creation. The policy
transformation module of the authorisation framework
will utilise both `spatial reasoning' and `visualisation
engine' to achieve this. Object and action parts of the
access policy quadruple can be selected directly from
the visual rendering of a BIM, which will provide the list
of selected object and associated actions. Some spatial
conditions such as connectivity between spaces can also
be visually selected.
8.3.2. Access control management
Once an initial access control policy for a facility
is created, it will evolve when new users are added
and spaces and objects contained within that are
being access-controlled change. Thus, access control
management plays an important role in ensuring the
eective and correct enforcement of access policies
overtime.
Given the objects and actions in policies are from
building information models, changes to spaces will
be directly reected in access control policies. The
`visualisation engine' will be use to render policies on
top of building spaces and see the changed conditions
for visual verication by a security ocer. Security
ocers can also select individual user roles or users and
visually check the objects and spaces they have access
based on current policy. This will require the use of
spatial functions from the both `spatial reasoning' and
`visualisation engine'.
8.3.3. Access control decision-making
The access control policies generated from the above
processes will then be used in decision-making of access
control requests. Building information models would
enable additional functionality to this process in terms
of operating spatial conditional functions on BIMs.
This authorisation framework provides two interfaces
that operate in distinct ways of decision-making. The
`access control interface' makes decisions within the
framework while the `access information interface'
enables external decision-making with the use of same
policies and BIM functions.
The decision making process of the authorisation
framework follows the XACML standard with the
dierence of the ability to use BIM specic spatial
function in policies that can be interpreted in `spatial
reasoning' through the `policy information point'. This
enables the use of spatial conditional functions, which
can simplify the policy rules.
8.4. Access control policy elements
In all the above access control processes one intercon-
necting aspect is the access control policy. It is a vital
aspect of the authorisation framework and we look at
some of the key elements of an access control policy
using BIMs.
These policies are used in controlling access to
dierent BIM objects such as building elements and
spaces. Most parts of a critical facility and its
representation in a BIM may be operationally sensitive
so users should only have access when they have a
legitimate need. For example, an air-conditioning
maintenance operator at an airport would have mobile
devices that can access and query BIM server to
visualise and view pump and duct locations, but the
details of the critical network wirings need not be
visible to them. Thus, the visualisation of a building
information model needs to be controlled based on
the role, assigned tasks (and possibly other contextual
factors such as time and location) of the user. The
information they can visualise to perform their job must
be governed by the access control policy
Objects: In all types of access requests, to both
objects within and external of BIMs, they will have
corresponding BIM objects to which the access refers.
In the case of access to BIM objects, the request would
identify the object. For other accesses, such has access
to a space, the request would identify the corresponding
space object or door object in BIM. Thus, access
policies can have a unied way of representing resources.
Either they can be IFC class based or individual
objects can be represented using their globally unique
identiers (GUID).
Actions: Each access request would specify an action
the subject intends to perform of the specied resource.
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These actions will vary depending on the type of the
resource. For logical resources within a BIM server,
create, view, modify, or delete can be typical actions
types. For an access request for physical access control
to a space, the access type would be to open a given
door. Thus, the access policies should be able to
support dierent categories of actions based on the
resources.
Conditional functions: The relationships between
building elements in a BIM might not necessarily
correspond to the physical elements. There can be
logical relationships such as zones and ownership. It is
useful to have the ability to specify access rules based
on these relationships. These can be based on functions
that can operate BIM elements as inputs and compute
dierent relationships from the BIM. The following are
basic functions that can be used in simplifying policies:
 Contains - Is the requested object contained with
an object (space) the user has access to?
 Connected - Is there a physical connection between
the two given spaces?
 Adjacent - Are the two given spaces adjacent? If
the user has access to both, he can access any
connecting objects (doors).
 Accessible - Is the requested space accessible from
the current location of the user with his access
clearance level?
8.5. Future work and research issues
For future work, we intend to complete the proof-
of-concept implementation of an administrative tool
utilising the concepts outlined in this paper. This
implementation work will be part of the Airport of the
Future project [71], based at the Brisbane International
Airport, Australia. This implementation will be used
to identify the required level of granularity for access
control rules. For example, if the access control request
is for rendering a oor of the building in visualisation,
it can have thousands of individual building elements
involved. It is important to analyse the practicality of
ne-grained control, which may generate large numbers
of requests against the level of security provided by
logical groupings.
Providing a formal foundation for the proposed
conceptual model will also form the basis of our future
work. As a part of this process, we investigate the
need for a policy specication language similar to Geo-
XACML that can address BIM specic requirements.
This would require a detailed analysis of existing
systems including our prototype implementation to
identify the policy elements and spatial functionalities
utilising building information models.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a novel use of Building
Information Models for access control. We proposed
a new access control framework that unies policy
administration and access control decision making
for physical and information resources. We also
identied a set of features that are necessary for an
authorisation framework that uses building information
models. Based on these features, we reviewed the
state of the art spatial access control models and
established the advantage of building information
models for spatiotemporal access control in conned
spaces. Finally, we have outlined our future directions
to formally dene and implement the conceptual
authorisation model presented in this paper.
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